The Thin Red Line — An Analysis of the Red Mosque Fiasco
15 Jul, 2007
What does the crisis at the Red Mosque in Islamabad mean for the
battle against Islam? What is the fallout of the successful raid and
killing of the terrorists? The West will hail this as proof of
Pakistan's allied status and of Gen. Musharaff's intent to suppress
terrorists; Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Pakistani Islamists will call
for retaliation and further Islamization; the Government of Pakistan
will basically continue the balancing act between the Islamists on
one side and the moderate Pakistanis and the West on the other.
Quite the usual, predictable responses...
So is there anything significant at all about this episode? Yes -
this encounter between the central government and the Islamists
clearly reveals (more than ever before) the fault lines of the
massive earthquake about to strike in the heart of Pakistan.
Yes, there is a well-organized, well-equipped and widely supported
"Jihad" going on within Pakistan, to establish a pure Islamic State.
This "jihad" is multi-faced, its strategy three-pronged: (1) the
Islamic political parties pretending to participate in Pakistan's
struggling pseudo-democracy and ruling the Northwest Frontier
Province (NWFP), which borders Afghanistan, (2) the religious
soldiers, officers and zealot commanders of Pakistan's army (the
dominant, ruling force) and intelligence agencies, which had
originally organized the war against Soviet Russia in Afghanistan,
the insurgency against India in Kashmir and propped up the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. (3) Lastly, but perhaps most dangerous is the
widespread network of mosques, madrassahs, communes, militant
training camps that breed tens of thousands of frothing Islamists -
the grass-roots of this Jihad.
Growing since the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, the Islamists
thrived under the patronage of the late President Zia-ul-Haq, who
permitted the infiltration of the Islamists into the civil services,
army and intelligence agencies. Propped by Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia, the Islamic movement attacked "kaffir" regimes in
Afghanistan and India, but all the while plotted to establish the
Islamic caliphate at home. In the 1990s, the objective was to plot
the overthrow of the elected regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz
Sharif in order to prove the incompetence of democracy. The zeal of
the Islamists was proven when in 1995, Maj. Gen. Zahirul Islam
Abbasi was arrested with 50 other Pakistani army officers for
plotting against the Bhutto regime and the army high command. The
mastermind of the plot was Abbasi and the leader of the Tablighi
Jamaat, Mufti Sufi Iqbal. While initially supporting the Nawaz
Sharif government, the Islamists soon mounted an offensive in
Kashmir with the active participation of the Pakistani army under
Gen. Pervez Musharaff - all without Sharif's knowledge or
permission. As the success was planned to be credited to Musharaff
and the Islamic zeal of the armed forces and the "mujahideen," with
the intention of showing the impotence of the non-Islamic Nawaz
Sharif regime, so was the failure of this 1999 Kargil War blamed
directly on Sharif, who was left dangling off a rope tightening
around his neck, soon to be overthrown by Musharaff himself.
Then cometh the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Pakistani part of
this was clear as daylight - the chief planners were Ramzi bin-al-Shib
and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, both Pakistanis. The U.K. airplane plot
of 2006 was planned in Pakistan and by Pakistanis. However, the U.S.
government delivered a sucker-punch to the Pakistanis by demanding
that they either help the U.S. or be identified with the terrorists.
It was merely a matter of convenience for the Pakistani state - the
fall of the Taliban simply made it necessary for the Islamists to
change direction and hasten its conquest of Pakistan itself.
The 2002 elections delivered a major victory to the Islamic
political parties, bringing them to power in the NWFP and increased
representation in the National Assembly. Death came within inches of
Musharaff in 2004 and the consistent failures of "pacts" and "peace
treaties" with the Islamic tribes and militant groups in the NWFP
and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) show how easily
the Islamists can defy the central regime and do what they please.
The invasion of Waziristan by the Pakistani army in 2005 simply
resulted in the meek withdrawal of the army in turn for yet another
"pact," which was never implemented by the tribals.
Since 2002, the Musharaff regime and the Islamists have entered into
an unofficial and informal, de facto division of power. The
Islamists have full political, social and armed control of the NWFP,
FATA and the northern part of the province of Balochistan, while the
central government retains control over the rest of the country.
This is clearly exhibited by the widespread proliferation of Islamic
courts, Islamic law, madrassahs and clerical rule. The Islamists own
the police and central government officials have only token
influence. The Taliban and Islamist warlords are able to hide,
vacation and plot their schemes amongst the Pashtun refugees camps
spreading across the region. The Islamists have moved millions of
Pashtun refugees into Balochistan and Pakistani-administered Kashmir
in order to establish control over the native Balochi and Kashmiri
peoples, who are mainly peaceful, settled peoples.
Not that the Musharaff regime has any particular authority across
the country. Aside from the Islamist infiltration of the military,
intelligence and civil authorities, the Islamists have extended
their influence and authority over tens of thousands of mosques
across Pakistan. Militant training camps, communes and madrassahs
extend across the province of Punjab and Sindh, and the Islamists
have also spread into the metropolis of Lahore and Karachi. It is
significant to note that this follows the settlement of Pashtun
refugees across the country.
The Red Mosque conflict represents the first major violation of this
power-sharing agreement. The Islamists, being in control of the
mosque itself, began assembling a militia of rabid supporters and
began projecting an alternative regime - establishing an Islamic
court and commissioning a religious police to extort money from
local residents and businesses as "zakat," hound women to wear
veils, flog those men and women seen holding hands, capturing
alleged prostitutes (including many innocent single women) and
bringing them to the mosque to the reformed (or raped, whatever...).
This is the routine of the pure Islamic state, being common to the
Taliban, Saudi Arabia and northwestern Pakistan. The problem was
that this pure Islamic state was launched in the country's capital,
Islamabad. Cities like Quetta, Peshawar or any provincial town would
do easily, eliciting no complaints, but the national capital was too
audacious. To tolerate this regime controlling a major portion of
the country would humiliate the constitutional government of
Pakistan in the eyes of its people and the world. A Taliban regime
within walking distance of the central government, the ally in the
war on terrorism?
The destruction of this was inevitable, as evidenced by the failure
of negotiations. Trying to negotiate and appointing a former prime
minister to conduct the dialogue was only a public effort to isolate
the Islamists and prevent harm to any civilians - an outright attack
would infuriate millions of Pakistanis, especially as hundreds of
civilians being used as human shields would be killed. But the
unexplained, last moment collapse of negotiations (when the clerics
themselves claimed that an agreement was formed) indicates the
desire of the Musharraf regime to stamp out this insolent invasion
of the capital. Launching the operation within hours, Musharaff used
not riot police or any ordinary army unit, but the Special Services
Group (SSG), the elite commando force. More than 100 militants,
soldiers and civilians were killed, including the cleric leading the
militants. Musharaff's tough action was hailed by moderates, but
violently protested in the NWFP and other Islamist-controlled areas.
While the Islamic political parties want to oust Musharaff, the
grass-roots supporters want to kill him and establish the caliphate
right away.
The operation to regain control of the Red Mosque has exposed the
truth - Musharaff is only regaining control of a part of Islamabad
and escaping international humiliation. The fury of the Islamists
will only accelerate the war to establish the Islamic caliphate in
Pakistan. With elections scheduled for later this year, it seems
more inevitable than year that Pakistan will soon fall to the
terrorists driven out from Afghanistan and the millions of Muslims
who drool over their delusional Islamic caliphate and "Qayyamat"
(Judgment Day).
Special Links:
Lal Masjid Siege on USA Today
Pakistan
Times report
Siege on Wikipedia
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Name: Stop Islam
Date: Saturday July 14, 2007
Time: 22:11:27 -0700
Comment
http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA36907 is a good supplement to this article.
Name: Get Educated
Date: Sunday July 15, 2007
Time: 07:45:57 -0700
Comment
http://moderate.wordpress.com/2007/03/02/americas-musharraf-dilemma/
Name:
Date: Thursday November 01, 2007
Time: 07:31:54 -0700